Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”
The news from Europe, particularly from within the euro zone, seems all bad.
Perspectives from expert contributors.
Perspectives from expert contributors.
In addition, the pessimists argue, because the troubled countries are locked into the euro, no good options are available. Gentle or even dramatic depreciation of the exchange rate for Greece or Portugal or Italy is not in the cards. As a result, it is hard to lower real wages so as to restore competitiveness and boost trade. This means that the debt burdens for these countries are likely to seem insurmountable for a long time. Hence default and global financial chaos seem likely.
According to the September 2011 edition of the Fiscal Monitor of the International Monetary Fund, 44.4 percent of Italian general government debt is held by nonresidents, i.e., presumably foreigners (see Statistical Table 9), on Page 72). The equivalent number for Greece is 57.4 percent, while for Portugal it is 60.5 percent.
And if you want to get really negative and think the problems could spread from Italy to France, keep in mind that 62.5 percent of French government debt is held by nonresidents. If Europe has a serious meltdown of sovereign debt values, there is no way that the problems will be confined just to that continent.
All of this is a serious possibility – and the lack of understanding at top European levels is deeply worrisome. No one has listened to the warnings of the last three years. Almost all the time since the collapse of Lehman Brothers has been wasted, in the sense that nothing was done to put government finances on a more sustainable footing.
But perhaps the pendulum of sentiment has swung too far, for one simple and perhaps not very comfortable reason.
There is no way to have just a little debt restructuring for Italy. If Italian debt involves serious credit risk – an end to the view that government debt has “no credit risk” and is a “risk-free asset,” with zero probability of default – then all sovereign debt in Europe will need to be repriced downward.
Will Germany will remain a safe haven? Even that is far from clear. According to the I.M.F., gross government debt in Germany will be 82.6 percent of gross domestic product at the end of this year (Statistical Table 7 of the Fiscal Monitor, on Page 70; the net government debt number for 2011, in Statistical Table 8, on Page 71,is 57.2 percent). Reports of German fiscal prudence have been greatly exaggerated.
German policy makers and the German public will not do well in the event of a major sovereign-credit disaster. Credit would tighten across the board. German exports would plummet. The famed German social safety net would come under great pressure.
There is an alternative to a decade of difficult austerity. The Germans could agree to allow the European Central Bank to provide “liquidity” support across the board to the troubled governments.
Many things are wrong with this policy – and it is exactly the kind of moral hazard-reinforcing measure that brought us to the current overindebted moment. None of us should be happy that Europe – and the world – has reached this point.
Among others, the bankers who bet big on moral hazard – i.e., massive government-backed bailouts – are about to win again. Perhaps the Europeans will be tougher on executives, boards and shareholders than the Obama administration was in early 2009, but most likely all the truly rich and powerful will do very well.
But if the German choice is global calamity or, effectively, the printing of money, which will they choose?
The European Central Bank has established a great deal of credibility with regard to keeping inflation at or close to 2 percent. It could probably offer a great deal of additional support – through creating money – without immediately causing inflation. And if the bank is providing a complete backstop to Italian government debt, the panic phase would be over.
None of this is a lasting solution, of course. Europe needs a proper fiscal center – much as the United States needed in 1787 and got under Alexander Hamilton’s policies from 1789. When he became Treasury secretary, the United States was in default and the credit system was almost completely broken. Some centralized tax revenue and control over fiscal deficits are needed.
Silvio Berlusconi stood in the way of all this. Other European leaders would not trust him to tighten Italian fiscal policy. But if he is really gone from power – and we should believe that only when we see it – there is now time and space for Italy to stabilize and, with the right help, find its way back to growth.
Of course, if the European Central Bank provides unconditional financial support to Italian, or other, politicians who refuse to bring their deficits under control, we are heading for another Great Inflation.
