Laura D’Andrea Tyson is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and served as chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Clinton.
Unprecedented volatility on global capital markets and a sharp correction in global equity prices are warning signs that the United States, Europe and Japan are teetering on the brink of a double-dip recession.
Perspectives from expert contributors.
Perspectives from expert contributors.
To develop cures to ease the jobs crisis, its causes must be diagnosed correctly. The fundamental cause is the drastic breakdown in private-sector demand brought on by the 2008 financial crisis that burst the debt-financed housing and spending boom preceding it.
This boom displayed all of the features of a major financial crisis in the making — asset price inflation, rising leverage, a large current account deficit and slowing growth. And the recession that followed had all of the features of what Richard Koo called a “balance-sheet” recession — a sharp decline in output and employment caused by a collapse of demand resulting from vast wealth destruction and painful de-leveraging by the private sector.
The economy is now mired in an anemic balance-sheet recovery in which many consumers and businesses continue to curtail their spending relative to their income, increase their saving and reduce their debt even though interest rates are near zero. And the process of de-leveraging is only beginning.
Real per-capita net worth in the United States is back at its 1999 level. The real per-capita value of housing equity has fallen to its 1978 level, and housing prices are still slipping in many parts of the country.
Household debt has come down to about 115 percent of disposable income, largely as a result of foreclosures, 15 percentage points below its peak of 130 percent in 2007 but significantly higher than its 1970-2000 average of 75 percent. Household saving has risen to about 5 percent of disposable income, far above the 2005 low of 1.2 percent but far short of the 1970-2000 average of 8 percent.
Consumption is the major driver of aggregate demand in the United States economy, and since early 2008 it has grown at an average rate of 0.5 percent in real terms. Not since before World War II has consumption growth been this weak for such an extended period.
Despite misleading claims by Republican members of Congress and by Republican candidates on the presidential campaign trail that the size of government, regulation and excessive taxation have caused the jobs problem, business surveys repeatedly have identified weak demand as the primary constraint on job creation.
As one small-business owner told The Los Angeles Times, “If you don’t have the demand, you don’t hire the people.” And the majority of economists agree on this diagnosis. They also agree that the recovery from a balance-sheet recession can be agonizingly long, with significantly slower growth and a significantly higher unemployment rate for at least a decade.
Recent data indicate that the United States is on such a course, and many economists are now drawing comparisons between it and Japan during the two “lost decades” following Japan’s 1989-90 financial crisis and ensuing balance-sheet recession.
A recent study by the economist Robert Gordon confirmed that the shortfall in private-sector demand, especially the demand for consumer services, residential and commercial construction, and consumer durables, is the primary cause of shortfalls in production and jobs.
He also found that strong net exports, in response to growing aggregate demand abroad, has reduced the jobs gap by about one million jobs, but these gains have been offset by cutbacks in domestic spending, including spending by state and local governments.
In other recoveries during the last 50 years, public-sector employment increased. This time it is falling: during the last year the private sector added 1.8 million jobs while the public sector cut 550,000.
What should policy makers do to combat the large and lingering job losses that result from a financial crisis and balance-sheet recession? Mr. Koo, whose book on Japan’s experience should be required reading for members of Congress, showed that when the private sector is curtailing spending, fiscal stimulus to increase growth and reduce unemployment is the most effective way to reduce the private-sector debt overhang choking private spending.
When the Japanese government tried fiscal consolidation to slow the growth of government debt in response to International Monetary Fund advice in 1997, the results were economic contraction and an increase in the government deficit. In contrast, when the Japanese government increased government spending, the pace of recovery strengthened and the deficit as a share of gross domestic product declined.
The credit rating agencies gave Japan a lower credit rating than Botswana, but this had no impact on the yield on Japanese government bonds. Contrary to the rating “experts,” investors were worried about a prolonged stagnation, not about the ability of Japan’s government to roll over its debt — and they were willing to buy this debt with their growing savings surplus. (Richard Koo, “U.S. Credit Rating Finally Downgraded,” Nomura Equity Research Report, Aug. 9, 2011)
Investors have had a similar response to the downgrade of United States government debt by Standard & Poor’s. To investors, the downgrade signaled the possibility of premature austerity and heightened the risk of a double-dip recession, and this drove the yield on 10-year government debt to levels not seen since the 1950s.
The market understands that the most important driver of the fiscal deficit in the short to medium run is weak tax revenues, reflecting slow growth and high unemployment, and that additional fiscal measures to put people back to work are the most effective way to reduce the deficit.
Every one percentage point of growth adds about $2.5 trillion in government revenue. An extra percentage point of growth over the next five years would do more to reduce the deficit during that period than any of the spending cuts currently under discussion. And faster growth would make it easier for the private sector to reduce its debt burden.
But what about the growth of public-sector debt that would result from more fiscal stimulus? Some economists worry that the growing government debt will itself become a constraint on growth. But that certainly is not the case now — with weak private-sector demand and a huge output gap, spending and borrowing by the government are not crowding out spending and borrowing by the private sector.
What about the fact that by some estimates the debt-to-gross domestic product ratio is approaching the 90 percent threshold identified by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff as likely to reduce growth by a percentage point a year? As Robert Shiller has pointed out, the causality between this ratio and growth runs in reverse when the economy has lots of slack as it has now.
Under these conditions, slow growth leads to a higher debt ratio, not vice versa.
The United States government can currently borrow funds and repay less than it borrows in constant dollars. Surely there are many job-creating investment projects in education, research and infrastructure that would earn a higher rate of return. I argued in favor of more government spending on such projects and the introduction of a capital budget in my previous Economix post.
Even Professor Rogoff acknowledged in a recent interview that he would support more government spending on infrastructure, and there is widespread bipartisan support for infrastructure investment in the Congress and in the business and labor communities.
Unfortunately, the current extension of the highway trust fund and surface transportation bill expires on Sept. 30, as does the authorization of the federal gasoline tax and highway user fees to finance them. Now there are signs that Republicans in Congress, egged on by Tea Party attacks on the size of government, may block both measures, precipitating more than 100,000 job losses a month.
In a balance-sheet recession caused by too much private-sector debt, the government should also use its resources to catalyze debt workouts and debt reductions.
In the United States, where mortgages account for most of the private debt overhang, the federal government should enact stronger measures to reduce principal balances on troubled mortgages and to make refinancing easier. These measures would help stabilize the housing market, would prevent future defaults and would free money for borrowers to use to pay down their debt or increase their spending.
This would translate into stronger private-sector demand and more jobs. Many economists, including me, warned in 2008 that the economy would not recover until the housing market recovered, and the housing market won’t recover until the debt overhang from the housing bubble is reduced through programs that shift some of the burden to creditors from debtors.
Increases in public spending along with housing relief and expansionary monetary policy helped the economy recover from the Great Depression in the 1930s. The same combination of policies can help the United States recover from the Great Recession now.
At the end of World War II, the federal debt-to-G.D.P. ratio was 109 percent, one and a half times what it is today. Yet after the war the economy thrived, and no one questioned the government’s ability to pay its debt over time.
We should now be fighting a war against unemployment and the waste of resources, poverty, inequality and the hopelessness it causes.
Government debt may rise as a result of this war effort, but no one will question the government’s ability to pay its debt provided Congress and the president commit now to a balanced multiyear plan to reduce the long-run deficit once the war against unemployment has been won and Americans are back at work.
