Friday, July 29, 2011

Podcast: G.D.P., European Stocks, Bernanke and Bing

If you were hoping for some economic good news to close out July, forget it. Not only did the Commerce Department offer up a gloomy assessment of the second-quarter gross domestic product, it also said the recession of 2007-9 was deeper and the recovery slower than we thought.

As Catherine Rampell reports, the G.D.P. —  that closely watched measurement of economic output —  grew at an annual rate of only 1.3 percent in the second quarter. That’s barely breathing. In fact, the economy over all is smaller now than when the recession began in 2007, she says. 

In the Weekend Business podcast, Ms. Rampell offers up one tiny bright spot: automobile sales were not as bad as expected.

Meanwhile, the Fundamentally columnist for Sunday Business, Paul Lim, urges investors not to run away from stocks in European companies, despite economic uncertainty there. In a podcast interview with Phyllis Korkki, he argues that European companies have fared slightly better over all than their American counterparts.

Steve Lohr talks with the Sunday Business editor, David Gillen, about his article in this week’s section on Microsoft’s high hopes for the search engine Bing — its David to the Goliath Google. And Gregory Mankiw, the Harvard economist, writing in the Economic View column, defends the performance of Ben S. Bernanke, the regularly pummeled chairman of the Federal Reserve.

You can find specific segments of the podcast at these junctures: the G.D.P. report (31:09); news summary (22:52); Microsoft (19:46); Gregory Mankiw (12:45); European stocks (6:24); the week ahead (0:51).

As articles discussed in the podcast are published during the weekend, links will be added to this post.

You can download the program by subscribing from The New York Times’s podcast page or directly from iTunes.

Ranking the Presidents by G.D.P.

The revised G.D.P. numbers damage the economic growth numbers for Obama and the George W. Bush administrations.

There is an element of unfairness in attributing economic growth to a president, of course. The government has limited influence on the economy, and the president can have limited influence on government policy, as anyone watching the current debate in Washington has surely noticed. Normal economic cycles mean that growth is likely to be less impressive for a president who enters office at the end of a boom, as George W. Bush did, and better for one who enters when growth is weak, as Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan did. If normal cyclical factors return, and President Obama has a second term, his record should end up much better than it currently appears. If he loses, he could be like Gerald Ford, who also took office during a deep recession.

With all those caveats, here are the annualized growth rates for real G.D.P. for every president who took office after the end of World War II.

Each president is given credit for growth through the quarter before he left office. For those who left at the end of their terms, that would be the fourth quarter of the election year. For Richard M. Nixon, who resigned during the third quarter of 1974, it is through the second quarter of that year.

Also shown are the figures for Presidents Bush and Obama that would have appeared had the numbers been calculated before today’s announcement of second quarter data and revisions to earlier numbers.

They are listed in reverse order of growth.

Barack Obama, 1.2% annual G.D.P. growth rate (previously 1.5%)
George W. Bush, 1.6% (previously 1.7%)
George H.W. Bush, 2.1%
Gerald Ford, 2.2%
Dwight Eisenhower, 2.5%
Richard Nixon, 3.0%
Jimmy Carter, 3.2%
Ronald Reagan, 3.5%
Bill Clinton, 3.8%
Lyndon B. Johnson, 5.0%
John F. Kennedy, 5.4%

Despite default risks, Treasury bond yields plunge as buyers rush in

Whatever fear global investors may have about a potential U.S. debt default, it’s being trumped for the moment by another fear: that the economy could be headed back into recession.

Money is pouring into Treasury notes and bonds Friday, driving yields down sharply, after the government said the economy grew at a dismally weak annualized rate of 1.3% last quarter -- below even the lousy 1.8% consensus estimate of economists.

The benchmark 10-year Treasury note yield (charted below) has tumbled to a new 2011 low of 2.83% from 2.95% on Thursday.

10yr729 The two-year T-note has slumped to 0.37% from 0.42%.

Many analysts had been warning that government bond yields could soar if the debt drama in Washington continued, with Congress unable to agree on extending the federal debt ceiling that the Treasury says will be reached on Tuesday.

Without an increase in the ceiling the Treasury won’t have enough money to pay all of its bills, which could lead to a debt default -- although there’s debate about when the Treasury actually would run dry of cash, and whether bondholders (as opposed to other government creditors) actually would get stiffed.

The debt-ceiling drama is giving investors pause in one part of the Treasury market: the shortest-term securities. Those yields have been rising in recent days because of concerns that a default would hit them first. The six-month T-bill yield rose to 0.16% Friday from 0.12% on Thursday and 0.08% a week ago.

But investors are showing no fear of owning longer-term Treasuries, even with the major credit-rating firms threatening to downgrade the U.S. from AAA to AA.

Some bond traders said Friday's rally reflected renewed hopes that Congress will strike a deal on the debt ceiling this weekend. In any case, the GDP report just further stoked demand.

With the economy faltering and Washington politics at their worst, many investors again are looking for a haven. Treasuries still are filling that bill, whether counter-intuitive or not.

So is gold: The metal closed at a record high Friday, gaining $14.90 to $1,628.30 an ounce.

-- Tom Petruno

RELATED:

Stocks fall on debt standoff, dismal growth

How the debt-ceiling crisis could affect ordinary Americans

U.S. may be able to pay bills beyond debt-ceiling deadline

Economic Growth: Worse Than We Thought

The good news six months ago was that the United States economy, as measured by gross domestic product, had completely recovered all the losses it suffered in the recession.

Never mind.

FLOYD NORRIS
FLOYD NORRIS

Notions on high and low finance.

The revised G.D.P. numbers put out by the government today make the recent history, which we thought was pretty poor, even worse.

Notions on high and low finance.

Even with a small gain in real G.D.P. in the second quarter, the total size of the economy, $13.27 trillion in 2005 dollars, is $55.9 billion, or 0.4 percent, smaller than the revised number for the fourth quarter of 2007. The revisions indicate the economy was larger before the downturn than we had thought and is smaller now.

We are now told that during the recession, the economy shrank by 5.1 percent. That is a full percentage point more than the 4.1 percent the old numbers showed. The recovery has also been slower.

The changes are pretty much across the board in the G.D.P. numbers. Personal consumption expenditures fell by a full percentage point more than previously thought. Gross private investment — on such things as buildings and planes and computers — declined by 34.2 percent during the recession, 2.6 percentage points more than previous estimates.

A note to those who are complaining the federal government is too big: we are now told that nonmilitary spending contributed less than thought to the G.D.P., both during the recession and the recovery. The same is true of state and local government spending.

There is one area where the changes make history look better — corporate profits. They were a little lower than we thought in 2008 and significantly higher in 2009 and 2010.

It is small comfort, but the United States still looks relatively good in G.D.P. recovery. Following is the change in real G.D.P. from the prerecession peak to the most recent numbers available. For the United States and Britain, that is the second quarter of this year. For the others it is the first quarter.

Switzerland, +1.2%

Germany, +0.1%

United States, -0.4%

France, -0.8%

Netherlands, -1.0%

Euro zone, -2.1%

Portugal, -2.7%

Britain, -3.9%

Spain, -4.0%

Italy, -5.1%

Japan, -5.6%

Greece, -9.9%

Ireland, -11.5%

The Role of Government Spending

As Congress continues to wrangle over a debt reduction bill that will inevitably cut government spending, Friday’s estimates of second-quarter gross domestic product provided a sobering look at how a decline in public spending and investment can restrain growth.

G.D.P. grew at an annual rate of just 1.3 percent in the second quarter, according to the Commerce Department, well below consensus forecasts. First-quarter growth was revised down sharply to just 0.4 percent from an earlier estimate of 1.9 percent.

The astonishingly slow growth rate from April through June was due in large part to sluggish consumer spending and an increase in imports, which subtract from growth numbers. But dwindling government spending also held back growth.

While federal government spending increased by 2.2 percent in the second quarter, that was all because of a jump in military spending. Excluding military, federal government spending and investment fell by 7.3 percent, a much larger fall than in the previous quarter. State and local government spending, which has been a crimp on growth throughout most of the official recovery, fell by 3.4 percent.

The figures will inevitably put further pressure on Congress as it tries to come up with a plan and figure out just how many billions of dollars can be shaved out of the government’s budget.

“A weak economy will only make the tough decisions on the budget even more difficult,” Nariman Behravesh, chief economist at IHS Global Insight, wrote in a research note Friday, “and the case for fiscal austerity in the near-term even weaker.”

On the other hand, said Steve Blitz, a senior economist for ITG Investment Research, policy makers have to decide whether to continue to pump up the economy through government spending or figure out a way to spur the private sector.

“We are probably at as important an intersection of policy and the economy as we were in late 2008 and early 2009 when the economy was collapsing,” Mr. Blitz said.

Mr. Blitz favors reforming tax policy and aggressively pursuing foreign markets for American goods. But, he said, the only real prescription is to wait. With so many households still working off the debt accumulated during the boom years, he said, “that’s just going to take time to work out, and you can’t cheat the process.”

A US debt deal will be done, but it will offer only temporary respite


20 freshmen of the house show their support for Boehner (Photo: Getty)

20 Freshmen of the House show their support for Boehner (Photo: Getty)


After another humiliating defeat for John Boehner’s bill, where are we now in the hunt for a compromise to head off US default and government shutdown? No nearer a deal, that’s where. It’s a quarter to midnight and House Republicans cannot even agree among themselves on the way forward, let alone reach an accord with the Democrat Senate. If there’s still nothing over the weekend, then we can expect markets, already jumpy enough, to be showing real signs of distress when they open first thing Monday morning.


After the markets have closed on Friday, the US Treasury is expected to announce details of what it intends to do in the event of failure to raise the debt ceiling. We have to assume it still plans to honour its debts above all other priorities. Even so, there’s talk of the Treasury preparing the ground for delayed payments. Whatever the contingency plans, the Treasury’s options are extremely limited.


There’s probably enough money left in the kitty to keep spending at current levels for a couple of weeks or so, but at some point it’s going to run out. When that happens, the Treasury will have no option but to move rapidly to bring spending into line with revenues. Almost overnight, an amount equivalent to some 8pc of GDP will have to be cut from spending.


Quite apart from the human grief this will cause in unpaid wages and bills, the effect on the wider economy would be utterly catastrophic. We are talking of an event of almost biblical proportions here. As the economy contracted, tax revenues would also plummet, and in little time at all the government would be chasing its tail down a downward spiral of cuts and falling tax revenues. At that point, default would become inevitable, however firmly the US might insist otherwise. The debt dynamics would be unsustainable.


It’s conceivable that the Federal Reserve could act to monetise the deficit by printing dollars to finance it, or simply cancel the government debt it already has on its balance sheet, but many would think that a default in all but name. These are nuclear options. The fallout would be extreme.


Once default is viewed as inevitable, the interbank lending market would freeze anew, prompting a second, global credit crunch on top of the violent contraction going on in the core of the US economy. It would be the 1930s all over again.


All this makes it pretty much unconscionable that a borrowing freeze will be allowed to happen. Somehow or other, a way will be found to raise the debt ceiling. It may not be by much, but it will buy a little time.


A sticking plaster solution is better than no solution at all, but it won’t address the US’s underlying fiscal problem and if the political stalemate continues in the meantime, we’ll only be back at the same point in six months to a year’s time. A credit downgrade already looks pretty much a done deal.


Uncertainty feeds economic stagnation, and so long as nothing is done to reach a lasting solution, decisions on whether to build that new factory, take on extra workers, or purchase the new automobile won’t get taken.


Dollar hegemony has been under threat for a long time now, but whatever the outcome of this latest political charade, it will come to be seen as a watershed moment when America finally lost the plot and condemned herself to lasting decline. Can a country that puts political bickering before the interests of economic and financial stability really be trusted with the world’s major reserve currency. I think not. The spell is broken. The age of the mighty dollar is over.


According to Winston Churchill, the US can in the end always be relied on to do the right thing, but only after all other possibilities have been exhausted. I wish we could be sure it was still true.



Jobs Deficit, Investment Deficit, Fiscal Deficit

Laura D’Andrea Tyson is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and served as chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Clinton.

Like many economists, I believe that the immediate crisis facing the United States economy is the jobs deficit, not the budget deficit. The magnitude of the jobs crisis is clearly illustrated by the jobs gap – currently around 12.3 million jobs.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

That is how many jobs the economy must add to return to its peak employment level before the 2008-9 recession and to absorb the 125,000 people who enter the labor force each month. At the current pace of recovery, the gap will be not closed until 2020 or later.

Perspectives from expert contributors.

History suggests that recovery from a debt-fueled asset bubble and ensuing balance-sheet recession is long and painful, with significantly slower growth in gross domestic product and significantly higher unemployment for a least a decade. Right now it looks as though the United States is following this pattern.

The jobs gap is primarily the result of the dramatic collapse in aggregate demand that began with the financial crisis of 2008. Even with unprecedented amounts of monetary and fiscal stimulus, the recovery that began in June 2009 has remained anemic, because consumers, the major driver of private demand, have curbed their spending, increased their saving and started to deleverage and reduce their debt — and they still have a long way to go.

As I asserted in my last post (and many other economists, including Lawrence Summers, Alan Blinder, Christina Romer, Peter Orzsag and Robert Shiller, have made this point, too), the jobs gap warrants additional fiscal measures to increase private-sector demand and promote job creation.

Sadly, current signals from Washington indicate that such measures will not be taken.

Instead, the risk grows that large, premature cuts in government spending will reduce aggregate demand, will tip the economy back into recession and drive the unemployment rate back into double digits.

Even if no budget deal is reached and no major spending cuts are made in the near future, there is now a serious risk that the rating agencies will downgrade government debt because of the political stalemate over a long-run deficit reduction plan. That would almost surely produce higher interest rates that could sink the economy into recession again.

Although the jobs gap and the high unemployment rate are the immediate problems in the American labor market, they are not the only ones. And there is no sign that the budget negotiations in Washington are going to address these other problems, either.

Even before the onslaught of the Great Recession, the labor market was in serious trouble. Job growth between 2000 and 2007 was only half what it had been in the preceding three decades.

Productivity growth was strong, but far outpaced compensation growth. Between 2002 and 2007, productivity grew by 11 percent, but the hourly compensation of both the median high-school-educated worker and the median college-educated worker fell.

During the same period, the real median income for working-age households declined by more than $2,000. The 2002-7 recovery was the only American recovery on record during which the income of the typical working family dropped.

And despite the recovery, job opportunities continued to polarize. Employment grew in high-education, high-wage professional technical and managerial occupations and in low-education, low-wage food-service, personal-care and protective-service occupations; employment fell in middle-skill, white-collar and blue-collar occupations. The drop in middle-income manufacturing jobs was especially precipitous.

To fashion the appropriate policy responses to these long-term structural problems in the labor market, it is first necessary to understand their causes. The key contributors are three:

1. Skill-biased technological change that has automated routine work while increasing the demand for highly educated workers with at least a college education, preferably in science, engineering or math.

2. Globalization or the integration of labor markets through trade and more recently through outsourcing.

3. The declining competitiveness of the United States as a place to do business.

Recent studies by Michael Spence and Sandile Hlatschwayo (discussed last week in Economix by Uwe Reinhardt) and by David Autor describe how technological change and globalization are hollowing out job opportunities and depressing wage growth in the middle of the skill and occupational distributions.

A widely cited commentary by Andrew Grove, former chief executive of Intel, and a prize-winning article by Gary Pisano and Willy Shih make similar arguments.

Many of the workers and jobs adversely affected by technological change and globalization are in the tradable goods sector, primarily in manufacturing. Nor is the United States labor market the only one to be affected by these forces: the polarization of employment opportunities is also occurring in the other advanced industrial countries.

Many of them, like Germany, are doing something about it. The United States is not. According to a recent McKinsey study, the United States is becoming a less attractive place to locate production and employment compared with many other countries.

A newly published study by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation reaches a similar conclusion. The United States is underinvesting in three major areas that help a country create and retain high-wage jobs: skills and training of the work force, infrastructure, and research and development.

Spending in these areas currently accounts for less than 10 percent of all federal government spending, and this share has been declining over time. And that’s despite the fact that the borrowing costs of the federal government have been near historic lows and much lower than the returns on economically justifiable investments in these areas.

Such investments fall into the “non-security discretionary spending” category of the federal budget, the category in line to be cut to historic lows to reduce the government deficit over the next decade.

In my previous Economix post, I said a budget deal should pair fiscal measures aimed at job creation now with a credible plan to reduce the deficit gradually and that both should be passed at once as a package. I also urged that the plan include an unemployment rate target that would postpone serious deficit-reduction measures until the target had been achieved.

I also think the plan should include a separate capital budget that distinguishes government spending on education, infrastructure and research as investments with committed revenues over several years. A capital budget would close the investment deficit in those areas that strengthen American competitiveness and promote high-wage job creation. None of the budget plans currently under debate include a separate capital budget.

The labor market is suffering from two problems: an immediate jobs gap, primarily the result of inadequate demand, and a long-term shortfall in rewarding employment opportunities for American workers, primarily the result of structural forces.

As a result of these forces, even when demand has recovered, many of the good jobs lost during the last decade will not be replaced by new good jobs without significant public investments to strengthen the attractiveness of the United States as a production location.

So far, the deficit-reduction proposals attracting attention do not address the labor market’s dual problems and leave many American workers and their families to face another lost decade.

A US debt deal will be done, but it will offer only temporary respite.


After another humiliating defeat for John Boehner’s bill, where are we now in the hunt for a compromise to head off US default and government shutdown? No nearer a deal, that’s where. It’s a quarter to midnight and House Republicans cannot even agree among themselves on the way forward, let alone reach an accord with the Democrat Senate. If there’s still nothing over the weekend, then we can expect markets, already jumpy enough, to be showing real signs of distress when they open first thing Monday morning.


After the markets hace closed on Friday, the US Treasury is expected to announce details of what it intends to do in the event of failure to raise the debt ceiling. We have to assume it still plans to honour its debts above all other priorities. Even so, there’s talk of the Treasury preparing the ground for delayed payments. Whatever the contingency plans, the Treasury’s options are extremely limited.


There’s probably enough money left in the kitty to keep spending at current levels for a couple of weeks or so, but at some point it’s going to run out. When that happens, the Treasury will have no option but to move rapidly to bring spending into line with revenues. Almost overnight, an amount equivalent to some 8pc of GDP will have to be cut from spending.


Quite apart from the human grief this will cause in unpaid wages and bills, the effect on the wider economy would be utterly catastrophic. We are talking of an event of almost biblical proportions here. As the economy contracted, tax revenues would also plummet, and in little time at all the government would be chasing its tail down a downward spiral of cuts and falling tax revenues. At that point, default would become inevitable, however firmly the US might insist otherwise. The debt dyanamics would be unsustainable.


It’s conceivable that the Federal Reserve could act to monetise the deficit by printing dollars to finance it, or simply cancel the government debt it already has on its balance sheet, but many would think that a default in all but name. These are nuclear options. The fallout would be extreme.


Once default is viewed as inevitable, the interbank lending market would freeze anew, prompting a second, global credit crunch on top of the violent contraction going on in the core of the US economy. It would be the 1930s all over again.


All this makes it pretty much unconscionable that a borrowing freeze will be allowed to happen. Somehow or other, a way will be found to raise the debt ceiling. It may not be by much, but it will buy a little time.


A sticking plaster solution is better than no solution at all, but it won’t address the US’s underlying fiscal problem and if the political stalemate continues in the meantime, we’ll only be back at the same point in six months to a year’s time. A credit downgrade already looks pretty much a done deal.


Uncertainty feeds economic stagnation, and so long as nothing is done to reach a lasting solution, decisions on whether to build that new factory, take on extra workers, or purchase the new automobile won’t get taken.


Dollar hegemony has been under threat for a long time now, but whatever the outcome of this latest political charade, it will come to be seen as a watershed moment when America finally lost the plot and condemned herself to lasting decline. Can a country that puts political bickering before the interests of economic and financial stability really be trusted with the world’s major reserve currency. I think not. The spell is broken. The age of the mighty dollar is over.


According to Winston Churchill, the US can in the end always be relied on to do the right thing, but only after all other possibilities have been exhausted. I wish we could be sure it was still true.



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