Sunday, July 31, 2011

Debt crisis averted, stock market focus will turn back to economy

The U.S. stock market lately has felt a lot worse off than it really was.

That’s the backdrop as the new trading week begins, with Congress and the White House apparently in a deal to raised the federal debt ceiling ahead of Tuesday’s cash-crunch deadline for the Treasury.

July was the third straight losing month for equities, but key indexes haven’t given up a huge amount of ground despite the debt drama in Washington and a barrage of weak economic data in recent weeks.

The Standard & Poor’s 500 index (charted below) fell 3.9% last week to end Friday at 1,292.28. But it’s down a modest 5.2% since reaching a multiyear closing high of 1,363.61 on April 29.

Spx731 So the decline so far doesn’t even qualify as a garden-variety “correction” in a bull market. A typical correction knocks 10% to 20% off market indexes. A drop of more than 20% would constitute a new bear market.

The market last week continued the trend in place since major indexes peaked in April: The selling has been concentrated in shares of companies that are most sensitive to the economy’s swings. That has been offset by much smaller losses in shares of companies whose businesses are less cyclical in nature.

The point being: If you have a diversified portfolio, this pullback has been a hiccup so far. That was true at the market's recent lows in June, too.

Of the 10 major industry sectors in the S&P index, industrial stocks have fallen the most since April 29, down an average of 10.6%. That group includes names such as Boeing, Deere & Co. and 3M Co.

Other sectors that have been hit hard include financials (down 9.7% on average since the April high) and basic-materials shares (i.e., commodity producers), off 6.6%.

Meanwhile, the utility sector within the S&P index is up 0.02% since April 29. Utilities are classic “defensive” stocks, meaning they tend to be a good place to hide amid market turmoil. Their above-average dividend yields also are a draw.

Another defensive sector that has held most of its ground is the so-called consumer staples group, which includes companies such as tobacco giant Altria Group, cereal maker Kellogg Co. and drugstore chain CVS Caremark. That stock sector is off just 2.2% since April 29, on average.

Stocks of smaller companies have fallen faster than blue chips over the last week, month and three months, but that’s typical when the market weakens. Yet small-stock indexes also are down less than the "correction" threshold of 10%.

Rty731 The Russell 2,000 small-stock index (charted at right) slumped 5.3% last week. It’s down 7.9% from its 2011 high reached on April 29.

The S&P 400 index of mid-size company stocks lost 4.9% last week and is off 7.1% since April 29.

Assuming the federal debt mess is resolved, investors are likely to focus more intently on the economy’s prospects. So far, strength in second-quarter earnings at many companies has largely offset concerns about  faltering U.S. growth apparent in much of the economic data.

This week, Wall Street will get key reports on the economy in July, including the ISM manufacturing-sector index (due Monday), car sales (Tuesday), the ISM services-sector index (Wednesday) and the all-important employment report (Friday).

With stocks holding on to most of the hefty gains they’ve racked up over the last year, the market clearly doesn’t believe what much of America believes -- that another recession (or worse) is looming.

This week’s data may help show who’s got it right on the economy as the U.S. debt drama recedes.

-- Tom Petruno

RELATED:

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Asian stocks rally, gold falls on debt agreement

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Asian stocks rally, gold falls as Congress sets debt deal

Stocks jumped in Asia as the new trading week began after Democrats and Republicans reached a deal to raise the U.S. debt ceiling and cut spending.

Gold fell and Treasury bond yields edged up. The dollar was mixed.

The Tokyo stock market’s Nikkei-225 index was up 180 points, or 1.8%, to 10,012 about two hours into the trading day Monday. Australia's main share index was up 1.9%, the South Korean market gained 1.7% and Hong Kong was up 1.5%.

Stocks had been pounded worldwide last week in part on fears that the U.S. might default on its debts. On Wall Street the Dow Jones industrial average fell 4.2% for the week, its worst loss in a year.

Resolving the debt crisis would remove one stumbling block for markets. Now, investors are expected to shift their focus back to the global economy, which has weakened substantially in recent months.

But for the moment, at least, investors are pulling back from some of the classic havens that attracted money as Washington’s debt drama worsened.

Gold futures fell $13 to $1,615 an ounce in electronic trading Sunday evening, after reaching a record high of $1,628.30 on Friday in New York.

The yield on the 10-year Treasury note rose to 2.83% from 2.80% on Friday.

Despite worries about possible default -- something that was never a serious risk in the eyes of many analysts -- Treasury yields had plunged on Friday after the government gave a dismally weak estimate of second-quarter economic growth.

That showed that, even as Congress’ gridlock over the debt ceiling put the world on edge, Treasuries were retaining their role as a place for capital to hide in times of economic uncertainty.

-- Tom Petruno

RELATED:

Parties agree to debt-ceiling deal

Debt ceiling Q&A: How we got here

Why the debt drama never pushed markets' panic button

 

 

 

The Debt Ceiling, in Pop Culture

Open Market

Enlisting readers in a hunt for answers.

During the financial crisis, the bank-run scene from “It’s A Wonderful Life” proved a useful pop-culture reference for helping people understand what was happening to the economy.

Enlisting readers in a hunt for answers.

This whole debt ceiling debacle and its potential consequences are similarly confusing, especially if you’re just tuning in now. It would be nice if there were a similar popular allusion to help people make sense of the debate. Yesterday I asked the Twitterverse for suggestions, and so far I’ve heard “Thelma and Louise,”  the end of “Planet of the Apes” and “Jackass: The Movie.“ Those aren’t exactly the kind of analogies I was looking for, but hey, they’re amusing all the same.

So readers, what do you think? Is there a film or other cultural touchstone that can help people understand the debt limit discussions and their potential consequences?

Used cars, immigration lotteries: Your weekly ScamWatch

Here is a roundup of alleged cons, frauds and schemes to watch out for.

Used cars –- Consumers should take caution to avoid fake dealerships when purchasing used cars on the Internet, the Better Business Bureau said in a news release. Some con artists are setting up websites for fake dealerships, requesting deposits and then failing to deliver the cars, the BBB said. Michelle Corey of the BBB said consumers should take caution when paying in advance for anything marketed on the Internet. She suggests consumers purchase only from well-established businesses with solid reputations. They also should use credit cards whenever possible in case they later need to challenge the purchases.

Immigration lotteries –- Immigrants living in the United States have been targets of a scam in which they receive emails that claim they have won lotteries to receive U.S. immigrant visas. The emails include an official-looking State Department letterhead and request payment of $819 through Western Union to a company in London, said Paul Young Choi, an immigration lawyer in Encino. Immigrants who receive such emails should ignore them, Choi said. He notes that U.S. government agencies do not send invoices by email requesting payment to third parties in foreign countries.

Online “Yellow Pages” –- A European-based operation has bilked U.S. small businesses, churches and nonprofit organizations out of millions of dollars through phony bills for online advertising, the Federal Trade Commission has alleged. The operation, based in Spain, England and the Netherlands, sends invoices to U.S. offices for online advertising they did not want and then refuses to issue refunds to companies that discover they’ve been duped, the FTC alleged in a lawsuit against several companies, including Yellow Page Marketing Yellow Publishing and Yellow Data Services.

-- Stuart Pfeifer

Saturday, July 30, 2011

Retail Roundup: E-readers, Wal-Mart Express, American Apparel on EBay

-- Starting Sunday, Toys R Us will begin to sell Amazon's Kindle e-readers and accessories. To celebrate the launch of the product, customers purchasing any Kindle will receive a free $10 Toys R Us gift card from July 31 through Aug. 6. The chain will carry models including the Kindle Wi-Fi in graphite and Kindle 3G + Wi-Fi in graphite.

OfficeMax, too, is embracing the e-reader trend, announcing that it will begin to offer Barnes & Noble's Nook on Saturday. The retailer said it would sell the all-new Nook and the Nook color reader's tablet.

-- Wal-Mart, which is trying to reverse a two-year U.S. sales slump, opened its first Express smaller-format store in Chicago this week. The world's largest retailer will test out the locations in three markets this year: Chicago, Richfield, N.C., and Arkansas, where Wal-Mart is based. Other major chains including Target are scaling down their stores as well.

-- American Apparel said it has partnered with EBay to create the first full online lifestyle shop on the auction site. The Los Angeles retailer said it made the move because of "extensive demand" on EBay for its fashions. Dov Charney, CEO of American Apparel, said there are more than 30,000 searches for American Apparel on EBay each month.

The store will launch in September and will offer a full assortment of products chosen by American Apparel including hoodies, T-shirts, underwear, jeans and children's clothing. Orders placed through the EBay site will be fulfilled by American Apparel's L.A. factory.

-- Andrea Chang

Friday, July 29, 2011

Podcast: G.D.P., European Stocks, Bernanke and Bing

If you were hoping for some economic good news to close out July, forget it. Not only did the Commerce Department offer up a gloomy assessment of the second-quarter gross domestic product, it also said the recession of 2007-9 was deeper and the recovery slower than we thought.

As Catherine Rampell reports, the G.D.P. —  that closely watched measurement of economic output —  grew at an annual rate of only 1.3 percent in the second quarter. That’s barely breathing. In fact, the economy over all is smaller now than when the recession began in 2007, she says. 

In the Weekend Business podcast, Ms. Rampell offers up one tiny bright spot: automobile sales were not as bad as expected.

Meanwhile, the Fundamentally columnist for Sunday Business, Paul Lim, urges investors not to run away from stocks in European companies, despite economic uncertainty there. In a podcast interview with Phyllis Korkki, he argues that European companies have fared slightly better over all than their American counterparts.

Steve Lohr talks with the Sunday Business editor, David Gillen, about his article in this week’s section on Microsoft’s high hopes for the search engine Bing — its David to the Goliath Google. And Gregory Mankiw, the Harvard economist, writing in the Economic View column, defends the performance of Ben S. Bernanke, the regularly pummeled chairman of the Federal Reserve.

You can find specific segments of the podcast at these junctures: the G.D.P. report (31:09); news summary (22:52); Microsoft (19:46); Gregory Mankiw (12:45); European stocks (6:24); the week ahead (0:51).

As articles discussed in the podcast are published during the weekend, links will be added to this post.

You can download the program by subscribing from The New York Times’s podcast page or directly from iTunes.

Ranking the Presidents by G.D.P.

The revised G.D.P. numbers damage the economic growth numbers for Obama and the George W. Bush administrations.

There is an element of unfairness in attributing economic growth to a president, of course. The government has limited influence on the economy, and the president can have limited influence on government policy, as anyone watching the current debate in Washington has surely noticed. Normal economic cycles mean that growth is likely to be less impressive for a president who enters office at the end of a boom, as George W. Bush did, and better for one who enters when growth is weak, as Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan did. If normal cyclical factors return, and President Obama has a second term, his record should end up much better than it currently appears. If he loses, he could be like Gerald Ford, who also took office during a deep recession.

With all those caveats, here are the annualized growth rates for real G.D.P. for every president who took office after the end of World War II.

Each president is given credit for growth through the quarter before he left office. For those who left at the end of their terms, that would be the fourth quarter of the election year. For Richard M. Nixon, who resigned during the third quarter of 1974, it is through the second quarter of that year.

Also shown are the figures for Presidents Bush and Obama that would have appeared had the numbers been calculated before today’s announcement of second quarter data and revisions to earlier numbers.

They are listed in reverse order of growth.

Barack Obama, 1.2% annual G.D.P. growth rate (previously 1.5%)
George W. Bush, 1.6% (previously 1.7%)
George H.W. Bush, 2.1%
Gerald Ford, 2.2%
Dwight Eisenhower, 2.5%
Richard Nixon, 3.0%
Jimmy Carter, 3.2%
Ronald Reagan, 3.5%
Bill Clinton, 3.8%
Lyndon B. Johnson, 5.0%
John F. Kennedy, 5.4%

Despite default risks, Treasury bond yields plunge as buyers rush in

Whatever fear global investors may have about a potential U.S. debt default, it’s being trumped for the moment by another fear: that the economy could be headed back into recession.

Money is pouring into Treasury notes and bonds Friday, driving yields down sharply, after the government said the economy grew at a dismally weak annualized rate of 1.3% last quarter -- below even the lousy 1.8% consensus estimate of economists.

The benchmark 10-year Treasury note yield (charted below) has tumbled to a new 2011 low of 2.83% from 2.95% on Thursday.

10yr729 The two-year T-note has slumped to 0.37% from 0.42%.

Many analysts had been warning that government bond yields could soar if the debt drama in Washington continued, with Congress unable to agree on extending the federal debt ceiling that the Treasury says will be reached on Tuesday.

Without an increase in the ceiling the Treasury won’t have enough money to pay all of its bills, which could lead to a debt default -- although there’s debate about when the Treasury actually would run dry of cash, and whether bondholders (as opposed to other government creditors) actually would get stiffed.

The debt-ceiling drama is giving investors pause in one part of the Treasury market: the shortest-term securities. Those yields have been rising in recent days because of concerns that a default would hit them first. The six-month T-bill yield rose to 0.16% Friday from 0.12% on Thursday and 0.08% a week ago.

But investors are showing no fear of owning longer-term Treasuries, even with the major credit-rating firms threatening to downgrade the U.S. from AAA to AA.

Some bond traders said Friday's rally reflected renewed hopes that Congress will strike a deal on the debt ceiling this weekend. In any case, the GDP report just further stoked demand.

With the economy faltering and Washington politics at their worst, many investors again are looking for a haven. Treasuries still are filling that bill, whether counter-intuitive or not.

So is gold: The metal closed at a record high Friday, gaining $14.90 to $1,628.30 an ounce.

-- Tom Petruno

RELATED:

Stocks fall on debt standoff, dismal growth

How the debt-ceiling crisis could affect ordinary Americans

U.S. may be able to pay bills beyond debt-ceiling deadline

Economic Growth: Worse Than We Thought

The good news six months ago was that the United States economy, as measured by gross domestic product, had completely recovered all the losses it suffered in the recession.

Never mind.

FLOYD NORRIS
FLOYD NORRIS

Notions on high and low finance.

The revised G.D.P. numbers put out by the government today make the recent history, which we thought was pretty poor, even worse.

Notions on high and low finance.

Even with a small gain in real G.D.P. in the second quarter, the total size of the economy, $13.27 trillion in 2005 dollars, is $55.9 billion, or 0.4 percent, smaller than the revised number for the fourth quarter of 2007. The revisions indicate the economy was larger before the downturn than we had thought and is smaller now.

We are now told that during the recession, the economy shrank by 5.1 percent. That is a full percentage point more than the 4.1 percent the old numbers showed. The recovery has also been slower.

The changes are pretty much across the board in the G.D.P. numbers. Personal consumption expenditures fell by a full percentage point more than previously thought. Gross private investment — on such things as buildings and planes and computers — declined by 34.2 percent during the recession, 2.6 percentage points more than previous estimates.

A note to those who are complaining the federal government is too big: we are now told that nonmilitary spending contributed less than thought to the G.D.P., both during the recession and the recovery. The same is true of state and local government spending.

There is one area where the changes make history look better — corporate profits. They were a little lower than we thought in 2008 and significantly higher in 2009 and 2010.

It is small comfort, but the United States still looks relatively good in G.D.P. recovery. Following is the change in real G.D.P. from the prerecession peak to the most recent numbers available. For the United States and Britain, that is the second quarter of this year. For the others it is the first quarter.

Switzerland, +1.2%

Germany, +0.1%

United States, -0.4%

France, -0.8%

Netherlands, -1.0%

Euro zone, -2.1%

Portugal, -2.7%

Britain, -3.9%

Spain, -4.0%

Italy, -5.1%

Japan, -5.6%

Greece, -9.9%

Ireland, -11.5%

The Role of Government Spending

As Congress continues to wrangle over a debt reduction bill that will inevitably cut government spending, Friday’s estimates of second-quarter gross domestic product provided a sobering look at how a decline in public spending and investment can restrain growth.

G.D.P. grew at an annual rate of just 1.3 percent in the second quarter, according to the Commerce Department, well below consensus forecasts. First-quarter growth was revised down sharply to just 0.4 percent from an earlier estimate of 1.9 percent.

The astonishingly slow growth rate from April through June was due in large part to sluggish consumer spending and an increase in imports, which subtract from growth numbers. But dwindling government spending also held back growth.

While federal government spending increased by 2.2 percent in the second quarter, that was all because of a jump in military spending. Excluding military, federal government spending and investment fell by 7.3 percent, a much larger fall than in the previous quarter. State and local government spending, which has been a crimp on growth throughout most of the official recovery, fell by 3.4 percent.

The figures will inevitably put further pressure on Congress as it tries to come up with a plan and figure out just how many billions of dollars can be shaved out of the government’s budget.

“A weak economy will only make the tough decisions on the budget even more difficult,” Nariman Behravesh, chief economist at IHS Global Insight, wrote in a research note Friday, “and the case for fiscal austerity in the near-term even weaker.”

On the other hand, said Steve Blitz, a senior economist for ITG Investment Research, policy makers have to decide whether to continue to pump up the economy through government spending or figure out a way to spur the private sector.

“We are probably at as important an intersection of policy and the economy as we were in late 2008 and early 2009 when the economy was collapsing,” Mr. Blitz said.

Mr. Blitz favors reforming tax policy and aggressively pursuing foreign markets for American goods. But, he said, the only real prescription is to wait. With so many households still working off the debt accumulated during the boom years, he said, “that’s just going to take time to work out, and you can’t cheat the process.”

A US debt deal will be done, but it will offer only temporary respite


20 freshmen of the house show their support for Boehner (Photo: Getty)

20 Freshmen of the House show their support for Boehner (Photo: Getty)


After another humiliating defeat for John Boehner’s bill, where are we now in the hunt for a compromise to head off US default and government shutdown? No nearer a deal, that’s where. It’s a quarter to midnight and House Republicans cannot even agree among themselves on the way forward, let alone reach an accord with the Democrat Senate. If there’s still nothing over the weekend, then we can expect markets, already jumpy enough, to be showing real signs of distress when they open first thing Monday morning.


After the markets have closed on Friday, the US Treasury is expected to announce details of what it intends to do in the event of failure to raise the debt ceiling. We have to assume it still plans to honour its debts above all other priorities. Even so, there’s talk of the Treasury preparing the ground for delayed payments. Whatever the contingency plans, the Treasury’s options are extremely limited.


There’s probably enough money left in the kitty to keep spending at current levels for a couple of weeks or so, but at some point it’s going to run out. When that happens, the Treasury will have no option but to move rapidly to bring spending into line with revenues. Almost overnight, an amount equivalent to some 8pc of GDP will have to be cut from spending.


Quite apart from the human grief this will cause in unpaid wages and bills, the effect on the wider economy would be utterly catastrophic. We are talking of an event of almost biblical proportions here. As the economy contracted, tax revenues would also plummet, and in little time at all the government would be chasing its tail down a downward spiral of cuts and falling tax revenues. At that point, default would become inevitable, however firmly the US might insist otherwise. The debt dynamics would be unsustainable.


It’s conceivable that the Federal Reserve could act to monetise the deficit by printing dollars to finance it, or simply cancel the government debt it already has on its balance sheet, but many would think that a default in all but name. These are nuclear options. The fallout would be extreme.


Once default is viewed as inevitable, the interbank lending market would freeze anew, prompting a second, global credit crunch on top of the violent contraction going on in the core of the US economy. It would be the 1930s all over again.


All this makes it pretty much unconscionable that a borrowing freeze will be allowed to happen. Somehow or other, a way will be found to raise the debt ceiling. It may not be by much, but it will buy a little time.


A sticking plaster solution is better than no solution at all, but it won’t address the US’s underlying fiscal problem and if the political stalemate continues in the meantime, we’ll only be back at the same point in six months to a year’s time. A credit downgrade already looks pretty much a done deal.


Uncertainty feeds economic stagnation, and so long as nothing is done to reach a lasting solution, decisions on whether to build that new factory, take on extra workers, or purchase the new automobile won’t get taken.


Dollar hegemony has been under threat for a long time now, but whatever the outcome of this latest political charade, it will come to be seen as a watershed moment when America finally lost the plot and condemned herself to lasting decline. Can a country that puts political bickering before the interests of economic and financial stability really be trusted with the world’s major reserve currency. I think not. The spell is broken. The age of the mighty dollar is over.


According to Winston Churchill, the US can in the end always be relied on to do the right thing, but only after all other possibilities have been exhausted. I wish we could be sure it was still true.



Jobs Deficit, Investment Deficit, Fiscal Deficit

Laura D’Andrea Tyson is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and served as chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Clinton.

Like many economists, I believe that the immediate crisis facing the United States economy is the jobs deficit, not the budget deficit. The magnitude of the jobs crisis is clearly illustrated by the jobs gap – currently around 12.3 million jobs.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

That is how many jobs the economy must add to return to its peak employment level before the 2008-9 recession and to absorb the 125,000 people who enter the labor force each month. At the current pace of recovery, the gap will be not closed until 2020 or later.

Perspectives from expert contributors.

History suggests that recovery from a debt-fueled asset bubble and ensuing balance-sheet recession is long and painful, with significantly slower growth in gross domestic product and significantly higher unemployment for a least a decade. Right now it looks as though the United States is following this pattern.

The jobs gap is primarily the result of the dramatic collapse in aggregate demand that began with the financial crisis of 2008. Even with unprecedented amounts of monetary and fiscal stimulus, the recovery that began in June 2009 has remained anemic, because consumers, the major driver of private demand, have curbed their spending, increased their saving and started to deleverage and reduce their debt — and they still have a long way to go.

As I asserted in my last post (and many other economists, including Lawrence Summers, Alan Blinder, Christina Romer, Peter Orzsag and Robert Shiller, have made this point, too), the jobs gap warrants additional fiscal measures to increase private-sector demand and promote job creation.

Sadly, current signals from Washington indicate that such measures will not be taken.

Instead, the risk grows that large, premature cuts in government spending will reduce aggregate demand, will tip the economy back into recession and drive the unemployment rate back into double digits.

Even if no budget deal is reached and no major spending cuts are made in the near future, there is now a serious risk that the rating agencies will downgrade government debt because of the political stalemate over a long-run deficit reduction plan. That would almost surely produce higher interest rates that could sink the economy into recession again.

Although the jobs gap and the high unemployment rate are the immediate problems in the American labor market, they are not the only ones. And there is no sign that the budget negotiations in Washington are going to address these other problems, either.

Even before the onslaught of the Great Recession, the labor market was in serious trouble. Job growth between 2000 and 2007 was only half what it had been in the preceding three decades.

Productivity growth was strong, but far outpaced compensation growth. Between 2002 and 2007, productivity grew by 11 percent, but the hourly compensation of both the median high-school-educated worker and the median college-educated worker fell.

During the same period, the real median income for working-age households declined by more than $2,000. The 2002-7 recovery was the only American recovery on record during which the income of the typical working family dropped.

And despite the recovery, job opportunities continued to polarize. Employment grew in high-education, high-wage professional technical and managerial occupations and in low-education, low-wage food-service, personal-care and protective-service occupations; employment fell in middle-skill, white-collar and blue-collar occupations. The drop in middle-income manufacturing jobs was especially precipitous.

To fashion the appropriate policy responses to these long-term structural problems in the labor market, it is first necessary to understand their causes. The key contributors are three:

1. Skill-biased technological change that has automated routine work while increasing the demand for highly educated workers with at least a college education, preferably in science, engineering or math.

2. Globalization or the integration of labor markets through trade and more recently through outsourcing.

3. The declining competitiveness of the United States as a place to do business.

Recent studies by Michael Spence and Sandile Hlatschwayo (discussed last week in Economix by Uwe Reinhardt) and by David Autor describe how technological change and globalization are hollowing out job opportunities and depressing wage growth in the middle of the skill and occupational distributions.

A widely cited commentary by Andrew Grove, former chief executive of Intel, and a prize-winning article by Gary Pisano and Willy Shih make similar arguments.

Many of the workers and jobs adversely affected by technological change and globalization are in the tradable goods sector, primarily in manufacturing. Nor is the United States labor market the only one to be affected by these forces: the polarization of employment opportunities is also occurring in the other advanced industrial countries.

Many of them, like Germany, are doing something about it. The United States is not. According to a recent McKinsey study, the United States is becoming a less attractive place to locate production and employment compared with many other countries.

A newly published study by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation reaches a similar conclusion. The United States is underinvesting in three major areas that help a country create and retain high-wage jobs: skills and training of the work force, infrastructure, and research and development.

Spending in these areas currently accounts for less than 10 percent of all federal government spending, and this share has been declining over time. And that’s despite the fact that the borrowing costs of the federal government have been near historic lows and much lower than the returns on economically justifiable investments in these areas.

Such investments fall into the “non-security discretionary spending” category of the federal budget, the category in line to be cut to historic lows to reduce the government deficit over the next decade.

In my previous Economix post, I said a budget deal should pair fiscal measures aimed at job creation now with a credible plan to reduce the deficit gradually and that both should be passed at once as a package. I also urged that the plan include an unemployment rate target that would postpone serious deficit-reduction measures until the target had been achieved.

I also think the plan should include a separate capital budget that distinguishes government spending on education, infrastructure and research as investments with committed revenues over several years. A capital budget would close the investment deficit in those areas that strengthen American competitiveness and promote high-wage job creation. None of the budget plans currently under debate include a separate capital budget.

The labor market is suffering from two problems: an immediate jobs gap, primarily the result of inadequate demand, and a long-term shortfall in rewarding employment opportunities for American workers, primarily the result of structural forces.

As a result of these forces, even when demand has recovered, many of the good jobs lost during the last decade will not be replaced by new good jobs without significant public investments to strengthen the attractiveness of the United States as a production location.

So far, the deficit-reduction proposals attracting attention do not address the labor market’s dual problems and leave many American workers and their families to face another lost decade.

A US debt deal will be done, but it will offer only temporary respite.


After another humiliating defeat for John Boehner’s bill, where are we now in the hunt for a compromise to head off US default and government shutdown? No nearer a deal, that’s where. It’s a quarter to midnight and House Republicans cannot even agree among themselves on the way forward, let alone reach an accord with the Democrat Senate. If there’s still nothing over the weekend, then we can expect markets, already jumpy enough, to be showing real signs of distress when they open first thing Monday morning.


After the markets hace closed on Friday, the US Treasury is expected to announce details of what it intends to do in the event of failure to raise the debt ceiling. We have to assume it still plans to honour its debts above all other priorities. Even so, there’s talk of the Treasury preparing the ground for delayed payments. Whatever the contingency plans, the Treasury’s options are extremely limited.


There’s probably enough money left in the kitty to keep spending at current levels for a couple of weeks or so, but at some point it’s going to run out. When that happens, the Treasury will have no option but to move rapidly to bring spending into line with revenues. Almost overnight, an amount equivalent to some 8pc of GDP will have to be cut from spending.


Quite apart from the human grief this will cause in unpaid wages and bills, the effect on the wider economy would be utterly catastrophic. We are talking of an event of almost biblical proportions here. As the economy contracted, tax revenues would also plummet, and in little time at all the government would be chasing its tail down a downward spiral of cuts and falling tax revenues. At that point, default would become inevitable, however firmly the US might insist otherwise. The debt dyanamics would be unsustainable.


It’s conceivable that the Federal Reserve could act to monetise the deficit by printing dollars to finance it, or simply cancel the government debt it already has on its balance sheet, but many would think that a default in all but name. These are nuclear options. The fallout would be extreme.


Once default is viewed as inevitable, the interbank lending market would freeze anew, prompting a second, global credit crunch on top of the violent contraction going on in the core of the US economy. It would be the 1930s all over again.


All this makes it pretty much unconscionable that a borrowing freeze will be allowed to happen. Somehow or other, a way will be found to raise the debt ceiling. It may not be by much, but it will buy a little time.


A sticking plaster solution is better than no solution at all, but it won’t address the US’s underlying fiscal problem and if the political stalemate continues in the meantime, we’ll only be back at the same point in six months to a year’s time. A credit downgrade already looks pretty much a done deal.


Uncertainty feeds economic stagnation, and so long as nothing is done to reach a lasting solution, decisions on whether to build that new factory, take on extra workers, or purchase the new automobile won’t get taken.


Dollar hegemony has been under threat for a long time now, but whatever the outcome of this latest political charade, it will come to be seen as a watershed moment when America finally lost the plot and condemned herself to lasting decline. Can a country that puts political bickering before the interests of economic and financial stability really be trusted with the world’s major reserve currency. I think not. The spell is broken. The age of the mighty dollar is over.


According to Winston Churchill, the US can in the end always be relied on to do the right thing, but only after all other possibilities have been exhausted. I wish we could be sure it was still true.



Thursday, July 28, 2011

Legal Payday

FLOYD NORRIS
FLOYD NORRIS

Notions on high and low finance.

My column this week concerns a class-action lawsuit on behalf of investors damaged by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The defendants include Lehman’s former officers and directors, as well as its auditor and 51 investment banks that underwrote Lehman securities.

Notions on high and low finance.

I don’t know how much, if anything, the investors will eventually get, although the fact that Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of United States District Court refused to dismiss a large part of the case may make settlements more likely.

Nor do I know how much will be collected in legal fees. The plaintiffs’ lawyers are typically paid only if they prevail, but the defense lawyers are presumably being paid by the hour.

I count 42 lawyers — 12 for the plaintiffs and 30 for the defendants — who have filed appearances in the case. There may, of course, be more lawyers working on the case back at the office. You can only imagine the fees being collected when the judge holds a hearing.

For the plaintiffs:

Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann (six lawyers filed appearances with the court)

Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check. (six)

For various defendants:

Allen & Overy (two)

Boies, Schiller & Flexner (two)

Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson (two)

Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman (two)

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett (four)

Cleary Gottleib Steen & Hamilton (three)

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (three)

Willkie Farr & Gallagher (one)

Proskauer Rose (four)

Dechert (three)

Latham & Watkins (four)

U.S. airlines say EU emissions plan could cost them billions

Airlines LAX The trade group that represents the nation's airlines predicts that a new European Union emissions tax could cost U.S. carriers at least $3 billion through 2020.

The Air Transport Assn. has called the European cap-and-trade emissions plan illegal and predicts it will hurt the industry if implemented on U.S.-based airlines next year.

The European Commission launched the cap-and-trade plan in 2005 and has targeted utilities and manufacturers. Starting next year, carbon dioxide emissions from airlines will be capped at 97% of their average 2004-06 levels and 95% in 2013.

Airlines that don't use all their emissions allowances can sell the excess to other carriers that exceed the limits. The fine for violating the plan is 100 euros, or about $142, for every ton of carbon dioxide that airlines emit above the limit.

The trade group estimates the fines could add up to $3.1 billion for all U.S. carriers between 2012 and 2020.

The airline industry generates about 2% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, according to the Air Transport Assn.

-- Hugo Martin

Photo: Airplanes taxi at Los Angeles International Airport. Credit: Los Angeles Times

Lady Gaga to farmers: Your fields are sexy

Ladygagameatdress Well, it's official: Farming is sexy.

Just ask Lady Gaga. We already know she enjoys draping her body in meat. But the performer, who is planning a Thursday afternoon concert in Hollywood, seemed to have had some fun out in the country's agricultural heartland.

She just returned from shooting music video footage in Nebraska for her song “You and I.”

When she popped into Omaha radio station KQCH recently, she happily told the interviewer there is nothing “sexier than shooting a scene in a cornfield,” according to a report in the Omaha World-Hearld newspaper.

Uh huh.

She added, according to the report, that some of her “little monster” fans did show up unexpectedly in the fields and compared the experience to the classic '80s horror movie “Children of the Corn.”

Maybe it’s not the farmland – but the memory of watching horror films – that’s sexy to her?

-- P.J. Huffstutter

Photo: Lady Gaga wears her controversial meat dress after winning eight 2010 MTV Video Music Awards at the Nokia Theater in Los Angeles. Credit: Mark Ralston / AFP/Getty Images

The Great Gatsby and the American debt crisis


Just recently I’ve been rereading The Great Gatsby by Scott Fiztgerald. Contrary to received wisdom, it’s not his best novel, which is Tender is the night – obviously – but Gatsby is more fun and if the definition of the truly great novel is to have contemporary relevance way beyond its time, the Great Gatsby succeeds in spades.


The boom and bust of the inter war years – The Great Gatsby is set in the roaring 1920s – was, in economic terms at least, a period much like our own, so many of the themes of this book are deeply resonant. And of course it ends with one of the great passages of English literature, which both defines the American dream and points to its ultimate fallibility.


Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgiastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter — tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther…. And one fine morning —

So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.


OK, so I don’t want to stretch the parallels too far, but it seems to me that with the crisis over the American debt talks, we are once again at a “Gatsby moment”. People are losing faith in the American dream – domestically and internationally. The green light is fading, and America seems incapable any longer of running faster, or stretching out its arms farther.


The optimism of youth is giving way to that resigned sense of inevitable decline that occurs in late middle age. The epic battle on Capitol Hill over America’s fiscal future defines this moment better than anything. Self belief and decisiveness is being replaced by indecision and confusion. Feeble impotence is taking the place of economic prowess and rampant self confidence. It’s a tragedy to behold.



What now for gas prices?


The price of UK spot gas

The price of UK spot gas between 2007 and 2011


It’s a tale of two perspectives this morning, with results from British Gas owner Centrica and oil major Royal Dutch Shell.


One the one hand, we have Simon Henry, finance director of Shell, saying that: “Gas prices are not particularly high at the moment.”


Meanwhile, British Gas, which made a £518m profit, says the fact that gas is 30pc higher over the last six months forced it into raising customer bills by 20pc. It claims that if it hadn’t hiked up bills, the supply business would have started to make a loss, wiping out most of this year’s profit.


No wonder billpayers are confused. A quick look at this graph of UK natural gas prices gives some context.


The gas price is much higher than it was during the recession, but still not quite as high as it was beforehand – making current record bills hard to stomach for consumers.


And while gas is indeed a lot more expensive than it was last autumn, it has not been going up substantially this year. In fact, the price has been coming down and is lower than when British Gas announced its last 7pc price increase in December.


So where are gas bills going from here? There are two factors here suggesting that the answer is probably ‘up’. Firstly, factor in Ofgem’s conclusion earlier this year that energy companies raise bills more quickly than they lower them when wholesale prices change. Secondly, consider Royal Dutch Shell’s comments about the gas price being “not particularly high”.


This view implies that the experts from the oil companies expect gas to keep on getting more expensive in the medium term – that is, over the decade. That’s why they are pumping billions of dollars into new gas technologies in Qatar and Australia to meet rocketing demand for the commodity in Asia.


However, a lot depends on whether the world’s economic recovery falters. If the European debt crisis gets worse or America stumbles further towards default, it’s possible that prices will head back down again for a while.


Even if the commodity price does come back down temporarily, we’re also going to be hit by the impact of increasing green taxes. I can think of at least four whose impacts are yet to be felt when the bill hits the mat over the next few years.


Any which way, it’s hard to imagine a scenario where average gas bills, now at a record of £665 per year, come down by very much.



Which Is in Worse Shape, U.S. or Europe?

Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”

The United States and Europe seem to be competing hard this summer for the title of “biggest economic problem.” Based on the latest news coverage, Europe might seem to be experiencing something of a resurgence, as last week the euro zone agreed on a deal involving mutual support and limiting the fallout from Greece’s debt problems.

In contrast, the United States seems to be mired in a political stalemate that becomes more complex and confused at every turn.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

But rhetoric masks reality on both sides of the Atlantic. The euro zone still faces an immediate crisis: the can was kicked down the road last week, but not far. The United States, on the other hand, is in much better shape over the next decade than you might think after listening to politicians of any stripe.

Perspectives from expert contributors.

American problems loom in the decades that follow 2021, so there is still plenty of time to sort these out; the bad news is that almost no one is talking about the real issues.

In a policy paper released by the Peterson Institute for International Economics on July 21, Peter Boone and I went through the details on the euro-zone crisis, including how this common currency area got itself into such deep trouble and what the likely scenarios are now (you can also see the discussion and contrasting views at the publication event).

In our assessment, the issue is lack of effective governance within the euro zone. Governments had an incentive to run reckless policy – either in terms of budget deficits (Greece), out-of-control banks (Ireland) or refusal to create an economic structure that would support growth (Portugal).

These policies were financed by loans from other countries, particularly within the euro zone, creating and sustaining the widely shared perception that if any country were to get into trouble, it would be bailed out by deep-pocketed neighbors (a phrase that in this context always means Germany).

At the heart of this system was a great deal of “moral hazard”; investors stopped doing meaningful credit analysis, so Greek or Spanish or Italian governments could borrow at just a few basis points above the rate for the German government (one basis point is a hundredth of a percentage point, 0.01 percent).

What has shocked investors’ thinking over the last three years are the realizations that Greece and some other “peripheral” countries have so much debt they may not be able to make all the contracted payments by themselves and that Germany and other northern countries have become convinced that foolish investors should suffer some losses.

Imposing losses on banks that made bad decisions is a sensible principle – but getting from here to there is not easy, particularly when the “periphery” includes Italy, with a far larger economy than Greece or Ireland or Portugal and with gross debt of nearly two trillion euros (about 120 percent of its gross domestic product).

Either Europe really ends moral hazard and widely restructures sovereign debts, or it keeps the bailouts coming, with the deep involvement of the European Central Bank, which will ultimately be inflationary. The package announced last week is a classic case of muddling through; it doesn’t really solve anything. (See the Economix Q. & A. on Greece’s latest debt deal.)

If Europe and the world now experience a growth miracle, these debt problems will recede in importance, because solvency is all about debt burdens relative to G.D.P. But if near-term growth is not strong, as seems increasingly likely, market participants will soon resume their contemplation of European dominoes.

In contrast, the United States has a simple fiscal problem – as I discussed in my testimony to the House Ways and Means Committee this week. Government debt surged from 2008, not because of Greek-style profligacy but rather because of an Irish-style banking disaster. When credit collapses, so does revenue. As the economy recovers, revenue comes back.

The single most interesting point about today’s debt ceiling debate is that over the 10-year forecast horizon that frames for the entire discussion, by any conventional definition no fiscal problem exists. In 2021, the United States is likely to have a small primary surplus at the federal level – meaning that the budget, before interest payments, will no longer be in deficit. (James Kwak elaborates on this point on Baseline Scenario, the blog we run together.)

The really bad budget numbers for the United States come after 2021, but these are not the focus of anyone’s current proposals on Capitol Hill. Compared with other countries, the increase in health-care spending from 2010 to 2030 is most troublesome and what will ruin us (see Statistical Table 9 in the International Monetary Fund’s Spring 2011 Fiscal Monitor; or, if you prefer a single picture that cuts to the chase, look at where the United States falls in Figure 1 on page 9 of the I.M.F.’s recent report on how to handle “fiscal consolidation” in the Group of 20 developed economies.)

The debate in Washington is both heated and off course, because no one is grappling with the difficult issue of how to control health-care costs. The Tea Party enthusiasts are intent on near-term government spending cuts as a condition of supporting any increase in the debt ceiling.

If this version of a libertarian tax revolt carries the day, the resulting fiscal contraction will slow the economy and fewer jobs will be created. It does nothing directly to address the looming budget issues beyond 2021.

In the near term, the Europeans have the bigger problem – and this will only be compounded by slower growth in the United States (home to about one-quarter of the world economy). Over the longer haul, it remains to be seen when and how politicians in the United States will take up the real budget issues.

So far, the evidence is not encouraging.

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

No summer hols for European policymakers as spreads again widen


An EU official has been quoted anonymously by Reuters as saying that last year the euro crisis abated once European policymakers retired to their sun loungers and thereby stopped contradicting each other. After another day of seemingly contradictory statements on precisely what last week’s “comprehensive solution” really amounted to, the EU official noted, “that moment can’t come soon enough this year”.


Regrettably for him, it’s already looking like they’ll be denied their relaxation. The cost of insuring Italian and Spanishg government debt against default rose sharply again today after Wolfgang Schaeuble, the German finance minister, sought to address domestic political concerns in Germany by saying that the deal didn’t give the European rescue fund “carte blanche” to buy bonds in the secondary market, but would only take place in “exceptional circumstances”.


Spreads on Spanish and Italian bonds are now back to where they were before last week’s emergency summit. This was partly attributed to worries about the American debt crisis, though quite why this should affect Spanish and Italian bond prices but not unduly concern US ones is indeed a mystery to behold.


In any case, it looks like being a long hot summer, and not one spent on the beach either.



Where the Job Growth Is: At the Low End

There’s more unhappy news for the millions of Americans hoping for a surge in the number of good, high-paying jobs — a new report concludes that the great bulk of new jobs created since the economic recovery began are in lower-wage occupations, paying $13.52 or less an hour.

The report by the National Employment Law Project, a liberal research and advocacy group, found that while 60 percent of the jobs lost during the downturn were in midwage occupations, 73 percent of the jobs added since the recession ended had been in lower-wage occupations, like cashier, stocking clerk or food preparation worker.

According to the report, “The Good Jobs Deficit,” the number of jobs in midwage and high-wage occupations remains significantly below the prerecession peak, while the number of jobs in lower-wage occupations has climbed back close to its former peak.

“During the Great Recession, employment losses occurred across the board, but were concentrated in midwage occupations,” the report said. “But in the weak recovery to date, employment growth has been concentrated in lower-wage occupations, with minimal growth in midwage occupations and net losses in higher-wage occupations.”

The report gives additional ammunition to those who argue, like David Autor, an economics professor at M.I.T., that there is a distinct hollowing out of the middle. It found that the number of jobs in midwage occupations remained 8.4 percent below the prerecession peak, while jobs in higher-wage occupations remained 4.1 percent below and lower-wage jobs were just 0.3 percent below their former peak.

The report divides the nation’s occupations into equal thirds: lower-wage, midwage and higher-wage. It found that during the downturn, the nation lost 3.9 million jobs in midwage occupations, while losing 1.4 million in lower-wage occupations and 1.2 million in higher-wage ones. The report said that of the net employment losses during the recession, 60 percent were in midwage occupations, while 21.3 percent were in lower-wage occupations and 18.7 percent in higher-wage ones.

Since the recession ended, the report said there had been a 1.7 million increase in the number of jobs in low-wage and midwage occupations, with low-wage jobs accounting for nearly three-quarters of that. But the number of jobs in high-wage occupations has declined by 461,994 since the recession ended (from first quarter 2010 to first quarter 2011).

“We should emphasize that it is too early in the recovery to predict whether these trends will continue,” the report said.

The report found that real wages had shown “a mild decline” since the recession began, of 0.6 percent. For workers in lower-wage occupations, median wages fell 2.3 percent after inflation — partly because many of the newer workers hired had lower wages than others in that group. For workers in midwage occupations, wages slipped by 0.9 percent, while there was some good news for workers in higher-wage occupations — their wages rose by 0.9 percent.

The report said the biggest job losses among higher-wage occupations came among managers, computer scientists and systems analysts, human resources workers, registered nurses and accountants and auditors.

The report was written by Annette Bernhardt, policy co-director of the National Employment Law Project. It said lower-wage occupations were those with median hourly ranges of $7.51 to $13.52 an hour (translating to $15,621 to $28,122 a year for a full-time worker), midwage occupations were $13.53 to $20.66 an hour ($28,142 to $42,973 for yearly full time) and high-wage occupations had median hourly ranges of $20.67 to $53.32 ($42,994 to $110,906 for yearly full time).

Growth, real terms growth, and inflation


lilico-wednesday

Click to enlarge


In this figure I show you three things. The red line is the standard rate of annual inflation in the cost of living – the all-items retail prices index. The green line tells us how the real value of quarterly output of the economy compared with the real value of output in the same quarter a year earlier (so, for example, real output in the second three months of 2011 is 0.8 percent higher than real output was in the second three months of 2010). I’ll call this “yearly real GDP growth”. The blue line tells us what happened to quarterly output in cash terms – when there is inflation, a rise in cash terms will be greater than the rise in real terms. I’ll call this “yearly money GDP growth”.


We can see that during most of the period 2000-2006, yearly money GDP growth was usually around 5 per cent, real GDP growth around 2.5 percent, and inflation around 2.5 percent. The first major departure comes in 2006, when money GDP growth goes well above 6 percent. Then inflation goes well above 4 percent (reaching 5 percent). Then we see all three series plummet during the 2008-9 recession. But then look at what happens after the recession. Money GDP growth returns to 5 percent, back to its pre-recession norm. There have been those (most notably Sir Samuel Brittan for many years, and more recently Giles Wilkes) who have argued that monetary policy should target money GDP growth instead of inflation. Indeed, some implicit variant of this is very probably an element in the Monetary Policy Committee’s thinking for 2009 onwards (it certainly was in mine). Well, the period after the recession should make Sir Samuel and the MPC happy – since the year following the commencement of quantitative easing (i.e. in our data, since the second quarter of 2010), yearly money GDP growth has been remarkably stable.


Now, if inflation had been around 2.5 percent, then 5 percent yearly money GDP growth would have meant about 2.5 percent real growth – as many hoped. But, in fact, inflation has been much higher than forecast, so real growth has been correspondingly lower. That extra cash the economy has produced just isn’t worth as much stuff. I suspect that is partly because the capacity for the economy to grow isn’t as high as we’d previously thought.


But now ponder this: what will happen if the economy does start to accelerate? If even the paltry growth of the past nine months has been associated with a rise in inflation, what might be the impact on inflation if the economy really starts to motor? The happy path would be if money GDP growth stayed pretty much where it is, but inflation fell back, so real growth accelerated. That is what the Bank of England hopes will happen. The other possibility is that when real growth accelerates, we will see a larger rise in money GDP growth, so inflation will accelerate even further. That’s what I expect.



Reader Response: The Stigma of Unemployment

I got a lot of interesting responses to my article yesterday about how workers must have a job to get a job. Here is my favorite, from Doug in New York:

This is exactly why I won’t date a women who is not already married. If she’s still single there’s probably a very good reason.

The Auto Industry, Stuck in the Slow Lane

Many of those grasping for a sign of economic optimism these days have pointed to the auto industry. The argument is that as supply chains come back on line following the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, more automobiles will be available for sale to consumers who have been waiting for cars to arrive.

But don’t expect a roaring comeback yet. A report released on Wednesday by AlixPartners, a business consulting firm, projects modest sales growth for the foreseeable future. The report forecasts that United States auto sales will reach 12.7 million units this year, up from the 11.5 million of 2010, but still far below the 16-million-plus that the industry regularly posted in the mid-2000s. AlixPartners forecasts 13.6 million sales in 2013, and does not project that the industry will get back to its peak before the recession “in this current cycle.”

According to the report, several factors are restraining growth in car sales. Unemployment remains high and housing values are depressed, making it difficult for families to tap housing wealth for car purchases. Historically, the report found, one in five vehicles sold has been financed by an appreciation in a car buyer’s home value.

And in a survey of 1,000 Americans by AlixPartners, 83 percent said they had delayed the purchase of a vehicle or planned to wait another year before buying a car.

John Hoffecker, managing director at AlixPartners, said the level of sales before the recession was unsustainable.

“Many people were thinking that was the norm,” Mr. Hoffecker said. “And our view was that it was not actual demand.”

Instead, he said, sales were buoyed by easy financing by carmakers and rapidly appreciating home and stock values. What is more, he said, automakers did not pay enough attention to their cost structures when selling cars, sometimes at a loss.

On the positive side, said Mr. Hoffecker, American automakers have already regained their profits. And future sales will be fueled by population growth in the United States as well as growing demand in developing markets.

The bad news is that the depressed level of auto sales will not help all the laid-off autoworkers get back to work. While engineers and sales representatives have been rehired to levels before the recession, Mr. Hoffecker said, production labor “is not going to come back any time soon.”

Employment of Elderly: Supply or Demand?

Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago.

The supply of elderly workers increased during the recession, and employment rates of the elderly increased along with it. This result is difficult to reconcile with Keynesian characterizations of the labor market.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

Last week I showed how employment per capita had increased slightly among elderly people since 2007, while employment per capita in the general population plummeted. I, and other economists previously, have concluded that employment of the elderly deviated so much from the general population because of changes in elderly labor supply.

Perspectives from expert contributors.

Recession-era supply episodes like these are important to identify, because they can prove or undercut Keynesians’ fundamental argument (so far unproved) that supply does not matter during a recession or during a “liquidity trap” such as we’ve experienced since the recession began.

(One Keynesian rhetorical trick is to “prove” the supply claim by pointing to the existence of unemployment. Of course, unemployment exists in large numbers, but that does not tell us whether, and how much, labor supply affects employment rates. Only the latter indicates the value, if any, of Keynesian policy prescriptions.)

In reaction to my post last week, Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, offered some analysis of weekly earnings and concluded that the demand for elderly workers increased during the recession even while it plummeted for everybody else. Supply played little or no role, he said.

Generally, I agree that wage rates are an important variable for gauging the relative importance of supply and demand (see, for example, my analysis of labor supply during the summer season, which featured hourly wage rates as one of three key indicators). But in this case, Dr. Baker’s weekly earnings results ran into a few contradictions.

First, what was the demand shift experienced by elderly workers that was so large as to completely offset the demand shift purportedly experienced by the rest of the population? Perhaps elderly workers picked up some of the hundreds of thousands of jobs that teenagers and other unskilled workers lost thanks to the minimum wage increases? Dr. Baker did not say.

Second, a huge increase in demand for the elderly might be expected to reduce their unemployment rates, yet the chart below shows how unemployment rates for the elderly followed very much the same time pattern as unemployment rates for the general population. (According to the Census Bureau, every person is either employed, unemployed or not looking for work, which is why unemployment and employment can move in the same direction). Dr. Baker’s purported demand shift is not visible in the unemployment data.

Third, Dr. Baker’s own data suggested that something other than demand was driving most, if not all, of the earnings changes he measured. Elderly employment per capita increased only 4.5 percent. Demand increases by themselves usually increase wage rates about the same amount that they increase employment, which in this case would be well less than 10 percent (for example, during Christmas season, when demand increases employment rates more than it increases wages, not less).

But Dr. Baker measured a weekly earnings increase of at least 17 percent, which tells me that weekly earnings were increasing for reasons other than demand. (This may have been because elderly people were working more hours per week, took on jobs with greater responsibility or because the composition of the elderly work force changed in the direction of greater skill. See this paper for a technical analysis of these forces.)

Labor supply, rather than labor demand, readily explains why elderly unemployment rates tracked the general population’s during the recession, while elderly employment did not: the willingness (or necessity, if you want) of working had changed more for the elderly than for the rest of the population. The fact that labor supply really does matter during recessions means that Keynesian policy prescriptions will not deliver what they promise.

Weak growth may force Chancellor into further austerity


George Osborne on a visit to Brompton Bicycle Ltd (Photo: PA)

George Osborne on a visit to Brompton Bicycle Ltd (Photo: PA)


Well there’s a thing. Among the list of excuses for another poor set of GDP growth figures are, bizarrely, Olympic ticket sales. May’s ticket sales, which at around £300m are equivalent to 0.1pc of GDP, apparently don’t count as spending until the event actually takes place in the third quarter of next year. But they would have taken money out of people’s pockets which might otherwise have been spent on other things, so there’s a double negative.


In all, the Office for National Statistics estimates that special factors – which it lists as the additional bank holiday for the royal wedding, the royal wedding itself, the after effects of the Great East Japan earthquake, the first phase of Olympic ticket sales, and record warm weather in April – cost approximately 0.5pc points of growth. If this is added back, then the 0.2pc growth announced on Tuesday for the second quarter doesn’t look so bad.


All the same, it’s quite bad enough, and the truth of the matter is that there are always once off special factors battering the economic statistics. They were not obviously more intense in the last quarter than any other. Why not just put the whole economic crisis down to special factors and be done with it?


The bottom line is that you would expect to see some recovery momentum building by this stage of the cycle, and we are not getting it. Indeed, if anything the outlook is worsening, both domestically and internationally. What can the Chancellor do about it? As I wrote in my column for Tuesday’s print edition of the Daily Telegraph, his options are regrettably limited.


There’s little if any scope for significant tax cuts to support the consumer part of the economy, though as I’ve written before, the Chancellor could reasonably indulge in a number of revenue neutral measures that would boost investment such as reversing the higher 50pc tax band and reintroducing taper relief on capital gains.


But big measures, such as a reversal of the VAT increase, would only knock deficit reduction off course, which in today’s febrile financial conditions would be extraordinarily dangerous.


If there is one thing the Government must do, it is maintain its commitment to fiscal austerity. If the deficit isn’t tackled, interest rates will rise, market confidence would be undermined, and future growth would be severely damaged. Britain and many other advanced economies have no option but wear the hair shirt for a prolonged period of time. Any attempt to wriggle out of this corrective adjustment to the excesses of the boom is the path to ruin.


The one positive in all this is that despite the increasingly weak outlook for growth there’s still every chance of the Government meeting its target of eliminating the structural deficit by the end of the parliament. Perhaps surprisingly, this target is quite insensitive to changes in the growth outlook. Even at rates of growth quite a bit lower than the Office for Budget Responsability has been predicting the target ought to be met.


How to explain this apparent paradox? The Government’s fiscal mandate requires “cyclically adjusted current balance by the end of the rolling five year period” (2015-16), in other words, total public sector receipts need to exceed total public sector spending (minus spending on net investment) after adjusting for the temporary effect of any spare capacity in the economy. The Government has supplemented this mandate with a target for public sector net debt as a percentage of GDP to be falling at a fixed date of 2015/16.


It follows that judgements around how much spare capacity there is in the economy – the output gap – will have a big effect on the cyclically adjusted current budget balance by the end of the parliament. The smaller the output gap, the larger the amount of the deficit that is structural and the less margin the Government has against its fiscal mandate. Conversely, if the output gap is wider, less of the deficit is strucutral and the Government has more margin against its mandate.


Well, the OBR has tested its finding that the government stands a high chance of meeting its fiscal mandate against a persistently weak demand scenario, and finds that lo and behold, the Government would still meet the mandate in such circumstances. It is not entirely clear why this is the case, as logically you would expect weaker growth than expected to act as a significant drag on public finance recovery. The best explanation is probably that unemployment has not risen as much as you might expect for such a deep recession, and that the effect on tax receipts and welfare spending of slow growth will therefore not be as damaging as we’ve seen in the past.


In any case, the OBR reckons that the output gap would have to be 1.5pc of GDP lower than assumed for there to be a significant risk to the fiscal mandate and the plan to eradicate the structural deficit. But what if it is lower, as some economists believe? The longer weak growth persists, the more likely it is that there really isn’t much spare capacity in the economy.


Indeed, the idea that capacity may have been permanently destroyed by the recession may itself be false; it may never have been there in the first place. If it turns out that virtually all the above trend growth of the boom was the result of credit and leverage, as seems ever more probable, then the output gap is going to be much lower than officially assumed and possibly even non existent.


In those circumstances, the UK economy really is in trouble. If the structural deficit is much larger than the Chancellor currently assumes, he would be forced into additional austerity measures to close it. If he doesn’t take them, the country’s triple A credit rating would be in jeopardy, as its debt dynamics would look correspondingly worse. More troubling still, he’d have to take such action without being able to rely on compensating monetary action from the Bank of England. To the contrary, the Bank would quite rapidly have to normalise interest rates, whose present highly accommodative disposition is based on the idea that there’s oodles of spare capacity slopping around the economy to soak up any inflationary pressures. Not pretty.



Of Loopholes and Potholes

Nancy Folbre is an economics professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

How can we fill the federal budget hole? The political standoff has been largely defined as a debate over tax hikes versus spending cuts.

Today’s Economist

Perspectives from expert contributors.

Many Democrats want to close tax loopholes in order to increase revenue. Many Republicans believe that government spending should be cut because it hurts the economy, rather than helping it — digging potholes, as it were, rather than fixing them.

Perspectives from expert contributors.

But many tax loopholes for big business are potholes for the rest of us. Closing and filling them would cut spending and improve economic efficiency.

Special provisions in the tax code often provide specific subsidies to distinct groups. Such tax expenditures have the same effect as spending programs.

The word “loophole” implies an opportunity for clever manipulation that leads to unintended results. While some loopholes fit this description, others represent explicit efforts to provide special benefits, reflecting greater political priorities and intense lobbying efforts.

As Senator Russell Long of Louisiana once put it, a tax loophole is “something that benefits the other guy; if it benefits you, it’s tax reform.”

Corporate tax policies in the United States provide significant benefits to shareholders, at considerable cost to everyone else.

Our statutory corporate tax rate, at 35 percent, looks high relative to those of other countries. But the many deductions, credits and other special breaks mean that the effective rate (or taxes actually paid) is much lower — an estimated 13.4 percent of profits over the 2000-5 period, lower than the average for other major industrialized countries.

As my fellow blogger Bruce Bartlett noted, “The United States actually has the lowest corporate tax burden of any of the member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.”

The proliferation of special breaks helps explain why corporate taxes have declined over time as a percentage of gross domestic product and as a percentage of total federal tax revenues.

Robert McIntyre of Citizens for Tax Justice points out that tax expenditures for corporate and other businesses will cost about $364.5 billion in 2011. That’s about a billion dollars a day.

Many special corporate tax breaks also contribute to serious economic inefficiencies.

Corporations that invest overseas rather than within the United States enjoy a huge advantage in the form of deferred taxes on profits. Republican policy makers are now proposing a “tax holiday” or even total elimination of American taxes on offshore profits.

Such policies would further encourage corporations to relocate to countries with the lowest tax rates and avoid contributing to social investments in health, education and environmental protection.

There also is good reason to believe that increased “offshoring” will reduce employment growth.

Some companies, especially those that rely heavily on intellectual property rights like patents, can simply shift their profits to offshore tax havens. Small business owners who cannot easily engage in such practices are rightfully indignant.

Other members of the business community are also speaking out. A Caterpillar executive recently filed suit against his company (the world’s largest construction equipment manufacturer), asserting that he was demoted for criticizing the company’s tax minimization strategy.

Everyone concerned about environmental sustainability should take a close look at corporate tax loopholes. The United States, like most other industrialized countries, continues to provide billions of dollars of special tax subsidies for fossil fuel industries that contribute to global warming.

Nuclear power is also on the dole. Without public subsidies, including limits on economic liability in the event of an accident, it would not be economically viable.

If only we could throw these loopholes into the potholes and have a real discussion of tax reform, instead of getting buried by partisan obsession with the ratio of overall tax increases to spending cuts.

Debt Crises, Real and Fake

There are real debt crises — Greece is going through one — and there are fake ones, created by politicians playing chicken with the nation’s credit.

I expressed that sentiment in a column last week that ran in the Asian editions of The International Herald Tribune on Friday. The new Greek rescue caused me to write a different column for The Times, and the I.H.T. column never made it onto the Web. It follows.

FLOYD NORRIS
FLOYD NORRIS

Notions on high and low finance.

In the world of government bond markets, never have the haves been treated so much better than the have-nots. The haves can borrow for virtually nothing. The have-nots, if they can borrow at all, must pay exorbitant rates.

Notions on high and low finance.

Yet politicians, even in the countries that investors seem to trust completely, talk of impending budget disaster if spending is not cut immediately.

This summer, as the markets offered a ‘‘no confidence’’ vote on Europe’s effort to rescue Greece — and grew notably more worried about Italy and Spain — they appeared to be highly confident about the debt of the United States government.

The yield on benchmark 10-year Treasury securities fell back below 3 percent this month, even as the Washington rhetoric about the debt ceiling heated up.

That was a sign that investors were not alarmed about a potential United States default, whether in the next few weeks or the next 10 years. If they were, rates would be soaring.

For much of the spring and summer, the proportion of people who believed that Congress would raise the debt ceiling seemed to vary based on the distance from Washington. The closer to Capitol Hill, the more doubt there was that rationality would prevail.

In politics, it appears, familiarity breeds contempt.

If rationality does prevail, the debt ceiling will be raised. For that matter, there is no good reason to have a debt ceiling other than to give politicians a chance to grandstand. The important decisions for Congress and the White House concern spending and taxing. Borrowing, or paying back debt as happened for a couple of years before the Bush tax cuts, is a result of the interplay of those decisions and the state of the economy.

Trying to control the result by putting limits on borrowing is a bit like trying to balance a household budget by waiting until the money has been spent and then deciding not to pay the bills.

To analyze the fiscal problems confronting the United States now, it is necessary not to confuse short-term and long-term problems. And it is crucial to pay attention to the state of the economy.

A weak economy will inevitably worsen the fiscal balance. Tax receipts fall because profits and incomes decline. Government spending increases on automatic stabilizers, like unemployment insurance payments.

To the extent high deficits are a result of a weak economy, a decision to react by cutting spending or raising taxes can lead to a vicious cycle. The solution, if possible, is to revive the economy even if that makes deficits temporarily worse.

One of the most important failures to analyze what was happening in the economy came in the late 1990s, when the United States government, to the surprise of almost everyone, began to run budget surpluses. Some of that was a result of tax increases and spending restraint, but a lot of it was caused by a completely unexpected and misunderstood surge in tax receipts.

That surge was the result of the bull market in stocks, and of the peculiar nature of it. Individual income tax payments soared both because of high capital gains and because profits from stock options are taxed at ordinary income rates, not the reduced rate charged on capital gains.

Most analyses ignored that. The conventional assumption was that the taxes on option profits were balanced by reduced taxes paid by companies. That would have been accurate if the companies were paying taxes and could use the additional deductions. But many of those companies — the heroes of the dot-com bubble — paid no taxes because they had no profits. So the extra deductions did them no good.

A proper analysis would have seen that the inevitable end of the bull market would reduce tax receipts, and a slowdown would increase government spending. In that sense, it is wrong to blame the Bush tax cuts for ending the surpluses of the Clinton years. They would have ended anyway. The deep tax cuts and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq made the deficits that much larger.

There is a risk that many analysts now are making the opposite mistake. Deficits have skyrocketed in recent years for reasons that are clearly temporary, or that will be temporary if the economy recovers.
In some of the debate, the short-term problems are mixed up with longer-term demographic concerns caused by the aging and retirement of the baby boomers and the rising costs of Medicare, the health insurance program for Americans over the age of 65.

It is worth looking at what has happened to financial markets around the world since the financial crisis exploded. A mild slowdown turned into something much worse after the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 showed the vulnerability of the financial system. Stock markets plunged around the world, credit dried up for many borrowers and there was a flight to safety. Central banks intervened with unprecedented measures and banks were bailed out. Deficits soared.

Now, more than two years later, the American stock market is about where it was in February 2008, just before the crisis hit. That may not sound impressive, but markets in nearly every other country are down sharply. The dollar has lost ground against the Swiss franc and the yen, but is up versus the euro and the pound.

The yields on government bonds — the price investors demand to lend money to the government — are down in countries with solid foundations, including the United States. They have soared in markets where default seems a real possibility, and are up in some European countries where investors are getting more nervous, including Italy and Spain.

That is a vote of confidence in Uncle Sam, at least relative to the alternatives.

Markets can be wrong, of course. But Europe is in far worse shape. Greece is insolvent. It must have its debt reduced, but a default could cause bank failures and substantial losses for the European Central Bank. Europe’s battles reflect the fact that there are no good alternatives. There is a crisis in Europe, where lenders now fear to tread. Would there be one in the United States if the politicians produced an unnecessary default? Let’s hope we will not find out.

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